



In terms of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008, a child who is
accused of having committed a crime may be diverted away from
formal court procedures even though he or she has the capacity
to incur criminal liability (ss 41(1) and 49(1)(b)). This diversion
may only be to an accredited diversion programme and diversion
service provider (s 56(1) read with the definition of ‘diversion’ in
s 1). In September 2013, the Minister of Social Development
published the names and details of entities that have been
accredited to provide diversion programmes and diversion ser-
vices in various provinces (GN 686 GG 36843 of 13 September
2013).
DRAFT LEGISLATION
The Judicial Matters Amendment Bill 7 of 2013 was tabled in
Parliament during 2013. Clause 36 of the original version, and
version B of this Amendment Bill, duplicate the amendment set
out in clause 2 of the Judicial Matters Third Amendment Bill 53 of
2013. The duplicate amendments refine the evaluation of the
criminal capacity of a minor by amending s 11(2)(b) of the Child
Justice Act to require the inquiry magistrate or child justice court
to consider the cognitive, moral, emotional, psychological and
social development of the child. The Portfolio Committee on
Justice and Constitutional Development (National Assembly)
subsequently addressed the duplication by rejecting the pro-
posed amendment effected by clause 36 of the Judicial Matters
Amendment Bill 7B (see Judicial Matters Amendment Bill 7C).
Therefore, only clause 2 of the Judicial Matters Third Amendment
Bill now deals with this refinement of the evaluation of the criminal
capacity of a minor.
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In 2013, the Mental Health Care Amendment Bill 39 of 2012
was referred to the Select Committee on Social Services of the
National Council of Provinces. The relatively minor amendments
effected by the Select Committee have been incorporated in
version 39B of the Amendment Bill. The Amendment Bill seeks to
amend the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 by inserting s 72A
into the Act (cl 1 of the Amendment Bill). This section provides for
delegation of powers by the Director-General of the national
Department of Health to officials in the department in order to
improve the application and effective implementation of the Act
(cl 1 of the Amendment Bill read with para 1.1 of the Memoran-
dum on Objects of Mental Health Care Amendment Bill, 2012,
attached to version 39B of the Amendment Bill). The Amendment
Bill further provides for the repeal of chapter 8 of the Mental
Health Act 8 of 1973 (cl 2). Chapter 8 deals with hospital boards




In APDOL v Road Accident Fund 2013 (2) SA 287 (GNP), the
Road Accident Fund raised a special plea of prescription against
the plaintiff’s claim for damages for loss of support. The claim had
arisen in 2004, when the plaintiff was sixteen years of age, but
was lodged only on 25 August 2010, when the plaintiff was
approximately 22 years and six months old. Prescription of a
claim in terms of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 usually
takes place three years after the date on which the claim arises
(s 23(1) of the Road Accident Fund Act). However, in the case of
a claim by a minor, prescription only starts to run once the minor
becomes a major (s 23(2)). Before s 17 of the Children’s Act 38
of 2005 came into operation on 1 July 2007, s 1 of the Age of
Majority Act 57 of 1972 set the age of majority at 21 years of age.
While the latter Act applied, a minor had three years after turning
21 to institute an action against the Road Accident Fund. Section
313, read with Schedule 4 to the Children’s Act, repealed the Age
of Majority Act, and s 17 of the Children’s Act lowered the age of
majority to eighteen years of age. The Road Accident Fund
argued that the lowering of the age of majority resulted in
prescription running from the date of the coming into operation of
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s 17 of the Children’s Act, with the result that the claim had
prescribed on 1 July 2010.
The court rejected this argument. Prinsloo J referred to
s 12(2)(c) and (e) of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 (para [18]),
which provides
Where a law repeals any other law, then unless the contrary intention
appears, the repeal shall not —
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the
repeal takes effect; or . . .
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of
any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, forfeiture or punish-
ment as is in this subsection mentioned,
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be
instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or
punishment may be imposed, as if the repealing law had not been
passed.
He stated that these provisions, read with ss 28 and 39(2) of
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, meant that
the lowering of the age of majority did not affect any right a minor
acquired before the Age of Majority Act was repealed and the
age of majority lowered to eighteen years (paras [24], [33]). He
held that a finding that the running of prescription of the plaintiff’s
claim had started on 1 July 2007 would not be in keeping with the
injunction in s 39(2) of the Constitution that legislation must be
interpreted in a way that promotes the spirit, purport and objects
of the Bill of Rights, and the statement in s 28(2) of the Constitu-
tion that a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in
every matter concerning the child (para [26]). He further pointed
out that no provision in the Children’s Act indicates that the Act
operates retroactively (para [25]). He accordingly dismissed the
special plea (para [34]).
This finding is undoubtedly correct. Last year, in Shange v MEC
for Education, KwaZulu-Natal 2012 (2) SA 519 (KZD) (see 2012
Annual Survey 704), the court was also confronted with the effect
that the lowering of the age of majority has on the date on which
extinctive prescription takes place. In that case, the plaintiff’s
claim arose because he had been assaulted by the deputy
principal of the school he attended. The Road Accident Fund Act
was consequently not in issue. Instead, the Prescription Act 68 of
1969 applied. The court held that if a person who was under the
age of 21 years acquired a claim before 1 July 2007, the change
in the person’s status brought about by s 17 of the Children’s Act
did not affect the date on which extinctive prescription occurs. In
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that case, too, the court pointed out that nothing in the Children’s
Act indicates that it operates with retroactive effect, and also
relied on ss 28 and 39(2) of the Constitution.
DOMICILE
In Lenferna v Lenferna (120/13) [2013] ZASCA 204 (2 Decem-
ber 2013), the court had to decide a dispute relating to the
division of the assets of a divorcing couple. The dispute turned on
whether the spouses’ matrimonial property system was deter-
mined by Mauritian or South African law. Because of the rule of
South African Private International Law that the law of the
husband’s domicile at the time of the marriage determines the
spouses’ matrimonial property system (Frankel’s Estate and
Another v The Master and Another 1950 (1) SA 220 (A)), Mauritian
law would apply if the husband were domiciled in Mauritius at the
time of the wedding, while South African law would apply if he
were domiciled in South Africa. In terms of Mauritian law, the
spouses would be married out of community of property while, in
terms of SouthAfrican law, they would be married in community of
property as they had not entered into an antenuptial contract
(Edelstein v Edelstein NO 1952 (3) SA1 (A)). (If the marriage were
out of community of property, the wife might possibly have been
entitled to redistribution of assets in terms of s 7(3)–(6) of the
Divorce Act 70 of 1979. However, she abandoned this claim
before the trial (para [9].) On redistribution of assets, and the
conflicting decisions as to whether this remedy applies to foreign
marriages, see CF Forsyth Private International Law 5 ed (2012)
307–11; Jacqueline Heaton South African Family Law 3 ed (2010)
133–6.)
The spouses were married in Mauritius in 1983 while both were
living there. Before their marriage, the husband was offered
employment at the SABC subject to his obtaining a South African
residence permit. His application for a residence permit was
successful and the spouses moved to South Africa a month after
their wedding. They continued to live in South Africa until their
divorce. The husband testified that he had always intended to
return to Mauritius and that if his application for a residence
permit had failed, he would have remained in Mauritius where he
had received several offers of employment. The trial court found
that the husband was domiciled in South Africa at the time of the
marriage. This finding was overturned on appeal.
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The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the husband was
domiciled in Mauritius. First, the court found that it was highly
unlikely that he would have formed the animus (intention) of
permanently settling in South Africa before taking up employment
in this country (para [8]). Secondly, he could not have established
a domicile of choice in South Africa without having moved to this
country as he could not have satisfied the factum requirement
without having settled here (ibid). Consequently, he was still
domiciled in Mauritius when the marriage was concluded, and
the spouses’ matrimonial property system was governed by
Mauritian law.
The Supreme Court of Appeal was correct in finding that the
husband did not meet the requirements for acquiring a domicile
of choice in South Africa at the time of the spouses’ marriage.
What might be questioned is why the court arrived at this finding
with reference only to the common law and failed to mention the
Domicile Act 3 of 1992. The reason is that the Act came into
operation on 1 August 1992 and is not retroactive (s 8(2)). As the
spouses were married in 1983 and their matrimonial property
system had to be determined with reference to that date, the Act
did not apply to them.
For the sake of interest, the difference between the animus
requirement for acquiring a domicile of choice in terms of the
common law and under the Domicile Act is briefly mentioned. In
Eilon v Eilon 1965 (1) SA 703 (A) 721A, the majority of the then
Appellate Division held that the common-law animus requirement
was met if the person ‘had . . . a fixed and deliberate intention to
abandon his previous domicile, and to settle permanently in the
country of choice’ and that ‘[a] contemplation of any certain or
foreseeable future event on the occurrence of which residence in
that country would cease, excludes such an intention. If he
entertains any doubt as to whether he will remain or not, intention
to settle permanently is likewise excluded’. Section 1(2) of the
Act, in contrast, simply requires that the person must have
the intention to settle at a particular place for an indefinite period.
Finally, it should be noted that, although the rule as to the use of
the husband’s domicile for purposes of determining the spouses’
matrimonial property system is probably unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to dwell on this
issue as both spouses were domiciled in the same country
(Mauritius) at the time of the marriage (para [10]). (On the
unconstitutionality of the rule, see, for example, Forsyth Private
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International Law 300–1; Jacqueline Heaton The South African
Law of Persons 4 ed (2012) 40–1; JL Neels ‘Die internasionale
privaatreg en die herverdelingsbevoegdheid by egskeiding’
1992 TSAR 336; Elsabe Schoeman ‘The South African conflict
rule for proprietary consequences of marriage: Learning from the
German experience’ 2004 TSAR 115, 117–18, 140.)
MINOR’S CONTRACT
In Road Accident Fund v Myhill NO 2013 (5) SA 426 (SCA), the
Supreme Court of Appeal removed any doubt there might have
been as to the impermissibility of set-off of a debt a debtor owes
to a minor against a debt the minor’s guardian owes to the debtor.
In this case, a mother and her two minor children were injured
when a motor vehicle crashed into them while they were walking
on or next to a road. Both children sustained head injuries, were
hospitalised for some time and suffered from epileptic seizures
after the incident. Damages were claimed from the Road Acci-
dent Fund for the injuries the mother and children sustained in the
incident. The Fund offered a small amount of money in respect of
the children’s injuries. It further reduced the amount by 30 per
cent as it found that the children’s mother had 30 per cent
contributory negligence in the incident. The children’s mother
accepted the offer. Ten years later, the respondent was
appointed curator ad litem to represent the children in a civil
action against the Fund. The respondent sought an order setting
aside the settlement and claiming substantial damages for the
children. The parties agreed that the issue of whether the
settlement should be set aside had to be decided first.
In the High Court the respondent relied, in the alternative, on
three causes of action for having the settlement set aside. The
second cause — that the settlement was prejudicial to the
interests of the two children — is the only one that is relevant for
present purposes. This cause was accepted by the High Court
which found in favour of the respondent and ordered the setting
aside of the settlement. The appellant appealed to the Supreme
Court of Appeal.
The only issue to be decided on appeal was whether the trial
court’s decision that the settlement be set aside because it
prejudiced the interests of the minors was correct. Delivering the
unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal, Leach JA
pointed out that it is settled law that a minor’s contract may be set
aside by using restitutio in integrum if the contract was prejudicial
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to the minor when it was concluded, and such prejudice was
serious or substantial (para [12]). He indicated that even on the
limited medical information available when the minors’ claims
were settled, it was clear that they had sustained head injuries
that were not insubstantial and had required their hospitalisation
(para [18]). Further, ‘[a]ny reasonable assessment of the chil-
dren’s damages should . . . have taken into account that there
was a real possibility that they had developed post-traumatic
epilepsy’, but this had not been done (ibid). Consequently, wholly
inadequate amounts had been offered and the settlement had
failed to provide for the minors’ future medical expenses (paras
[19], [21]). Moreover, the amounts offered had been reduced by
30 per cent to cater for an apportionment against the minors’
mother (para [22]). Leach JA stated that it was trite that set-off
can only occur in the case of reciprocal indebtedness, and that
‘individuals in their personal capacities are treated as different
persons from when they act in representative capacities’ (para
[23]). Therefore, a debtor cannot set off a debt he or she owes to
a minor against a debt that the minor’s parent owes to the debtor
(ibid).
Despite this position being trite, the Fund relied on Voet
Commentarias ad Pandectas 16.2.8 to argue that it could set off
any amount it could recover from the minors’ mother in her
personal capacity against the amount it owed to her in her
capacity as the minors’ natural guardian (para [24]). Leach JA
quoted paragraph 16.2.8 from Johannes Voet Commentarius ad
Pandectas, Translated with Explanatory Notes and Notes of All
South African Cases by Percival Gane Under the Title The Selective
Voet Being the Commentary on the Pandects [Paris Editon of 1829]
by Johannes Voet [1647–1713] and the Supplement to That Work
by Johannes van der Linden [1756–1835] (1956). This paragraph
reads as follows (footnotes omitted)
(i) Guardian’s claim against own debtor and debt of ward. —
Furthermore a guardian who sues against his own debtor in his
own name is not held liable to suffer set-off of what his own ward
owes to the opponent sued.
(ii) Guardian’s claim for debt to ward and his own debt. — Nor does
what a guardian claims in the name of his wards from a debtor to
the wards undergo set-off of what the guardian owes in his own
personal name to such debtor of the wards.
(iii) Guardian’s debt to creditor who is also in debt to ward. — But if a
guardian is sued in his own name by his own creditor who is
likewise a debtor of the ward, the position is rather that set-off is
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allowed of that which the guardian owes against that which is
owed to his own ward.
He pointed out that the Fund relied solely on paragraph (iii) as
authority for its argument. He further pointed out that paragraph
(iii) was inconsistent with paragraphs (i) and (ii), and that
paragraph (iii) ‘flies in the face of the well-established general
principles of set-off’ set out above (para [25]). Referring to
academic criticism of the principle Voet espouses in paragraph
(iii) (paras [25]–[27]), Leach JA held that there was ‘no reason in
principle why the general rules of set-off, which exclude a debt
owed by or to an individual in his personal capacity being set-off
against a debt owed by or [to] that person in a representative
capacity, should not operate in respect of claims brought by
custodian parents on behalf of their minor children’ (para [28]).
He held that failing to apply the general rule could only disadvan-
tage the minor. He proceeded
While there do not appear to be any reported decisions advancing the
contrary conclusion, I think the time has now come for this court to put
the matter beyond doubt and to rule that a debtor liable to a minor
child, when sued by the child’s custodian parent, may not set off
against its liability to the child any amount that it may personally be
owed by the custodian parent (ibid).
He therefore concluded that the Fund was not allowed to
reduce its liability to the minors by setting off the debt the minors’
mother owed to it as a result of her contributory negligence,
against the amount of such liability (para [29]). As the minors
were clearly prejudiced by the set-off, the settlement agreement
had to be set aside (paras [29], [31]). Leach JA accordingly
dismissed the appeal (para [32]). The decision is correct.
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